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WHOSE BRIGHT IDEA WAS THIS ANYWAY? 
THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN MARYLAND 
 
By: Yosef Kuperman1 
 
This paper describes how Maryland switched from 
the life-tenured appointed judiciary under its original 
Constitution to an elected judiciary. It traces the 
history of judicial selection from the appointments 
after 1776 through the Ripper Bills of the early 
nineteenth century to the eventual adoption of 
judicial elections in 1850. It finds that the supporters 
of judicial elections had numerous complex motives 
that boiled down to trying to make the Judiciary less 
political but more publically accountable. At the end 
of the day, Marylanders trusted elections more than 
politicians.  
 
I.     INTRODUCTION  
 
     Nobody likes electing judges these days; it produces bad results.  After 
Baltimore County Circuit Court Judge Alexander Wright infamously lost his 
seat in a contested primary election in 2000, for example, the Baltimore Sun 
blamed “ballot position and dirty tricks.”2  The Sun understandably called for 
reform.3  After Wright, reappointed to the bench within weeks of his defeat, 
lost again in 2002, the Baltimore Sun cited various explanations — racism, 
dirty politics, bad campaigning, and voter ignorance.4  Not one of these 
possible explanations  reflects well on judicial elections.  
                                                                                                                               
1 Yosef Kuperman is a Maryland attorney and a fan of history.  Yosef would like to 
thank the Honorable Frederic N. Smalkin (retired), whose advice considerably 
improved this paper, and the many other people who proofread, edited, commented 
on, and cite checked this. Yosef accepts sole credit only for the mistakes. 
2 Editorial, An Ugly Process, BALT. SUN, Mar. 9, 2000, at 20A.  The Baltimore Sun 
ascribed Judge Wright’s defeat not to racism, but to the fact that “Wright” appears 
last on alphabetical lists and to dirty tricks.  (Judge Wright would have been the first 
African American judge elected in Baltimore County.)  Judge Robert Dugan, whom 
the Sun had accused of playing the dirty tricks, wrote a letter to the editor denying 
those allegations.  The Honorable Robert Dugan, Letter to the Editor, BALTIMORE 
SUN, Mar. 25, 2000, at 12A. 
3 Editorial, supra note 2, at 20A. 
4 Jonathan Rockoff & Stephanie Hanes, Judge’s Loss Spurs Questions of Racism, 
BALT. SUN, Nov. 7, 2002, at 1B.  Judge Wright himself declined to ascribe his defeat 
to racism.  Id. University of Baltimore School of Law Professor Byron Warnken, 
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     Calls for reform abound.  Numerous writers have devoted countless 
articles and books to fixing the system.5  To highlight a local example, Dana 
Levitz and Ephraim Siff recently published an article explaining how 
Maryland should change the election of circuit court judges.6  So far, voters 
remain unpersuaded.7   
     Although reform remains a current topic, people rarely ask why Maryland 
adopted judicial elections in the first place.  Whose bright idea was this 
anyway?  On reflection, judicial elections do not make much sense.  They 
deliberately politicize a branch of government whose legitimacy depends 
precisely on being apolitical.  They are not just another historical left-over 
like the Electoral College.  Maryland originally used life-tenure and 
executive appointments like the United States Constitution.8  In fact, judicial 
elections are not even part of the wider common law tradition.  “Almost no 
one else in the world has ever experimented with the popular election of 
judges.”9  However, Maryland seems set on keeping them. 
     Maryland originally adopted judicial elections as part of a larger judicial 
reform aimed at making judges less political and at the same time more 
answerable.  Marylanders simultaneously switched from life-tenured 
appointed judges to elected, term-limited judges because Marylanders 
wanted judges to answer to the people, not the politicians.  This change did 
not take place suddenly, or in a vacuum.  Maryland had a long and troubled 
history with life-tenure.  Introduced after the revolution, it received little 
respect.  Maryland in fact fired its entire judiciary between 1801 and 1806 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																						
interviewed at the time, felt that “what really happens for the vast, vast majority of 
voters is they have no idea who the candidates are.”  Id.  The controversy attracted 
enough attention at the time to generate a series of letters to the editor.  See Letters to 
the Editor, BALT. SUN, Nov. 13, 2002, at 14A; Letters to the Editor, BALT. SUN, 
Nov. 19, 2002, at 14A. 
5 See, e.g., JED SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012). 
6 Dana Levitz & Ephraim Siff, The Selection and Election of Circuit Judges in 
Maryland: A Time for Change, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 39 (2009). 
7 81.9% of state appellate judges and 87% of state trial judges must still stand for 
election.  ABA, Report No. 2 of the Task Force on Lawyer’s Political Contributions, 
Part 2, Attachment B. (1998) But see Roy A. Schotland, Comment, Law & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 149, 154, which puts the numbers at 87% for 
both. 
8 U.S. CONST.  art. III, § 1.  The Constitution adopted life-tenure because the British 
had adopted it to prevent the King from sacking judges who ruled against him.  See 
Shugerman, supra note 4, at 15-18.  They thought it would protect judicial 
Independence against a tyrant.  Id.  
9 Shugerman, supra note 5, at 5.  This needs some qualifiers.  Parliament, for 
example, originally had a judicial component to it, as did some colonial assemblies.  
Id. at 14-15.  Some relics of this persist until modern times.  Massachusetts’s 
legislature remains the “General Court” even today, and Britain’s highest court of 
appeals was technically a committee of the House of Lords until 2009. 
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after the Jeffersonians drove the Federalists from office.  Complaints about 
hyper-partisan judges were still present in 1850, when Maryland adopted 
judicial elections.  Marylanders believed that judicial elections would cure 
those problems by making the judges answerable directly to the people, 
instead of the corrupt politicians.   
 
II.     REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
     Early historians of judicial elections thought that judicial elections 
emerged from the trend towards popular rule during the Age of Jackson.  
Viscount James Bryce, for example, discussed judicial elections when trying 
to explain American democracy to a British audience.10  Bryce ascribed 
judicial elections to “a wave of democratic sentiment” that “swept over the 
nation” during the Jacksonian period.11  To Bryce, judicial elections were a 
terrible idea to which Americans stuck out of  “obedience to a so-called 
[democratic] principle.”12  Learned Hand similarly attributed judicial 
elections to “a burst of democratic enthusiasm” and “the full tide of 
Jacksonian democracy.”13  Some historians interpreted this movement as an 
attempt to bring the judiciary to heel by making them responsible to the 
people; others saw it as a partisan move by Jacksonian political outsiders 
                                                                                                                               
10 James Bryce, 1st Viscount Bryce OM, GCVO, PC, FRS, FBA was a British jurist, 
historian, and politician.  He served as British Ambassador to the United States from 
1907 to 1913.  Bryce based his observations on a Tocqueville-esque tour of the 
United States.  
11 JAMES BRYCE, 2 MODERN DEMOCRACIES 63 (1921).  Bryce interestingly ascribed 
the related American drive for direct legislation, in part, to a popular belief in “a sort 
of mystical sanctity not susceptible of delegation [that] dwells in the Whole People,” 
although he also credited anger at special interests and “a deep-rooted distrust of 
State Legislatures.”  Id. at 93.  
12 Id. at 93. 
13 Learned Hand, The Elective and Appointive Methods of Selection of Judges, in 3 
PROC. ACA. POL. SCI. N. Y.  130, 130-31. (Henry Musey, ed., 1913). 
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aimed at seizing judicial power.14  Both of these explanations — as later 
historians demonstrate — are simply wrong.15 
     Modern historians challenged this interpretation beginning with Kermit 
Hall in 1983.  Hall argued that judicial elections were a lawyerly attempt to 
enhance judicial power and prestige by tying judicial office to the ultimate 
source of legitimacy — the ballot box.16  According to Hall, politically 
moderate lawyers dominated the constitutional conventions that adopted 
judicial elections.17  They thought that judicial elections would lead to faster, 
more prestigious, more independent, and less political courts.18  Elections 
would allow judges “a regular opportunity to have their power confirmed in 
the same way as governors and legislators.”19  Elections would give judges 
the political legitimacy to curb the legislature and create “judicial 
legislation.”20 
     Ten years later, Caleb Nelson rejected Kermit Hall’s theory.21  If judicial 
elections were merely a lawyerly plot, they would not have received 
enthusiastic popular support.22  Although many lawyers at the conventions 
supported judicial elections, that support simply reflected the enormous 
                                                                                                                               
14 See generally Kermit Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform 
and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337, 338-39 (1983) 
(summarizing existing literature on the subject). Interestingly, much previous 
scholarship obsesses about New York’s seminal role in starting the ball rolling in 
1846.  See, e.g., Russell Niles, The Popular Election of Judges in Historical 
Perspective, 21 Rec. Ass’n B. City N. Y. 523, 523 (1966) (claiming that if not for 
New York’s experience, “we might not now have elected judges . . .  in the United 
States.”)  Hall discards this theory as erroneous based on studying the debates from 
the constitutional conventions that allegedly followed New York’s lead.  Hall, supra 
note 14, at 340, n. 14.  This author's own perusal of Maryland’s debates convinces 
him that Hall is correct. 
15 See Caleb Nelson, A Reevaluation of the Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the 
Elective Judiciary in Ante-Bellum America, 37 Am.  J. Legal Hist. 190, 193-99 
(1993) (rebutting the “partisan” explanation of the origins of judicial elections with 
cold hard facts.)  See also Hall, supra note 14, (rebutting the “judicial leash” theory 
with cold hard facts.)  
16 Hall, supra note 14, at 354. 
17 Id. at 342-43.  The only exception was Massachusetts. 
18 Id. at 343; see Kermit Hall, The “Route to Hell” Retraced: The Impact of Popular 
Election on the Southern Judiciary, 1832-1920, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL 
HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 229, 230 (David Bodenhamer & James Ely, eds., 1984). 
19 Hall, supra note 14, at 350. 
20 Id. at 350-51. 
21 Nelson, supra note 15, at 203.  Strangely, Nelson seems to misread Hall’s work.  
He claims that Hall “is wrong to suggest that [moderate reformers] identified 
legislatures with popular majorities.”  Id.  Hall simply does not say that.  In that 
light, Nelson’s theory does not refute Hall’s theory, but rather expands on it.  
22 Id.  
92 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 46.2	
	
popularity of judicial elections.23  In fact, even after lawyers soured on the 
idea during the Progressive Era, judicial elections remained (and remain) 
popular.24   
     Rather, Nelson suggested that judicial elections “arose from the people’s 
profound distrust of their own government.”25  The conventions that 
instituted judicial elections wanted the elected judiciary to restrain not only 
majorities, but also the entire government.26  Judges had to protect the people 
against their corrupt legislatures and governors.27  To protect the people from 
the government, the judges had to be independent of the government.  
Practically, that meant direct elections.  But the conventions did not trust the 
judges any more than the legislatures.  Judicial elections were “part of a 
coherent program to rein in not just the legislatures, but all the people’s 
agents.”28   
     In February, 2012, Jed Shugerman expanded on Nelson’s theory.  Writing 
about the history of judicial independence, Shugerman observed that judicial 
elections arose from widely held beliefs in judicial independence and the 
separation of powers.29  Advocates of judicial elections always claimed that 
the elections would promote “judicial independence and constitutional 
protections.”30  They hoped that an elected judiciary would provide a “less 
partisan and less politicized bench” that could check the other branches of 
government.31 
     Shugerman placed judicial elections firmly in their historical context.  
Judicial elections appeared in response not only to “ideas about judicial 
independence, parties, and democratic politics” but also to “interest groups 
and economics.”32  The conventions that adopted judicial elections during the 
antebellum period did so as part of a larger response to economic panics in 
the 1830s and 40s.33  Those conventions blamed their economic woes on 
“legislative overspending on internal improvements.”34  They therefore 
attempted to limit legislative power by various means, including by creating 
a stronger and more independent judiciary.35 
     None of these theories properly describes what happened in the Maryland 
Convention or address Maryland’s unique history leading up to change.  




26 Nelson, supra note 15, at 205. 
27 Id. at 206. 
28 Id. at 207. 
29 SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 6-9. 
30 Id. at 6. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 8. 
33 Id. at 10. 
34 SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 10.  
35 Id. 
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Judicial elections, at least according to the men who advocated for them on 
the convention floor, did not aim to keep the legislature from squandering 
money.  Rather, the elections were intended to reduce political corruption and 
secure a more honest judiciary by taking the power to appoint judges away 
from venial public servants.  
 
III.     COLONIAL – 1801 
 
     Early Maryland efforts to improve the judiciary never contemplated 
judicial elections.  Before 1776, Maryland had no judicial elections and 
preserved its judiciary largely unchanged through the American Revolution.  
When Maryland finally implemented major judicial reforms in the 1790s and 
early 1800s, it did not implement elections.  Instead, the reforms attempted to 
improve the judiciary by implementing a professional, life-tenured system 
based on gubernatorial appointments. 
     Maryland’s Judiciary during the colonial period resembled England’s 
during the same period.  Justices of the peace and county courts heard small 
matters locally.36  More important matters and appeals from the county courts 
came before the “Provincial Court” in Annapolis, the equivalent of England’s 
King’s Bench.37  Disappointed litigants in the Provincial Court could appeal 
to a “Court of Appeals,” which consisted of the Governor and Council, but 
few did.38  From there, truly aggrieved litigants could appeal to the King’s 
Privy Council in England, but even fewer bothered.39  Lacking professional 
judges, Maryland staffed the courts with justices of the peace.40  Every judge 
                                                                                                                               
36 CARROLL BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND: A HISTORY 4 (1928), 
available at http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001 
/000368/html/am368p--1.html.  Carroll Bond served as Chief Judge of the Court of 
Appeals from 1924 until 1943, and chaired the “Bond Commission” for reforming 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland.   
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 53. The “Court of Appeals” was actually a side-job of the governor and his 
council, and not an important side job at that.  Id.  In May Term, 1776, for example, 
Bond reports that the Court had all of seven appeals docketed for the term.  Id.   
39 Id. at 42-43.  Due to travel costs, appeals to the British privy council were 
apparently impractical for most litigants.  The privy council still exists and still hears 
appeals from (among other things) some Commonwealth countries, the Court of 
Admiralty of the Cinque Ports, and the Disciplinary Committee of the Royal College 
of Veterinary Surgeons. Role of the JCPC, JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY 
COUNCIL, http://www.jcpc.gov.uk/about/role-of-the-jcpc.html, (last visited Jan. 24, 
2013). 
40 BOND, supra note 36, at 8-11.  Bond points out that although the judges were 
laymen, laymen in the colonial period knew far more law than layman today.  These 
layman also used young lawyers as clerks and could refer difficult questions to the 
Maryland Bar.  Id. at 11-15.  Also, some lawyers found their way onto Governor’s 
council, so the court system was not entirely bereft of trained legal minds.  Id. at 44-
45.  
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and justice of the peace served at the pleasure of the governor, although by 
the middle of the eighteenth century, judges customarily sat until voluntary 
retirement.41 
     Maryland adopted a more modern-looking court system in its post-
Revolutionary Declaration of Rights and Constitution.42  The governor and 
council lost their judicial functions.43  Instead, the Constitution established a 
new Court of Appeals, “composed of persons of integrity and sound 
judgment in the law,” to supervise the entire judicial system.44  The 
Provincial Court, its membership set at three lawyers, became the “General 
Court.”45  The county courts, however, continued to be lawyer-free.46  For the 
most part, the personnel, except in the Court of Appeals, remained the 
same.47  The judges at every level held their position with life-tenure after 
gubernatorial appointment.48 
     Maryland’s new Court of Appeals had trouble getting off the ground for 
want of qualified personnel.  At the first session of the General Assembly in 
February, 1777, the House of Delegates sent the Senate a list of nominees for 
every office in the new Constitution.49  But the Delegates had trouble finding 
anyone suitable for the Court of Appeals.50  Due to the low workload and low 
salary, the seats on the court were not a full time job, but the judges could not 
take other legal work.51  The Delegates  finally nominated and the Senate 
finally appointed the five judges to the Court of Appeals in January, 1779.52  
                                                                                                                               
41 Id. at 55.  The American colonies used appointed judges and justices of the peace 
everywhere except Rhode Island and Connecticut.  RICHARD ELLIS, THE 
JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 6 (1971). 
42 See, e.g., MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, art. VI (embracing 
separation of powers in principal).   
43 Id. at art. LVI. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at art. XL, XLVIII. 
47 BOND, supra note 36, at 62. 
48 MD CONST. OF 1776, art. XL, XLVIII. 
49 VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE STATE OF 
MARYLAND, H.D. FEB. 1777 1st. Sess., at, 58-60 (1777). 
50 Id. at 60; BOND, supra note 36, at 61-62. 
51 BOND, supra note 36, at 64-65. 
52 VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE STATE OF 
MARYLAND, H. D. OCT. 1778, 1st. Sess. at 64-65 (1778).  BOND, supra note 36, at 63.  
The General Assembly chose to name five judges because five judges had formed a 
quorum when the colonial Court of Appeals met without the governor or the 
president of the council.  Id. at 62.  The House of Delegates had originally wanted to 
name three judges and have the remaining two seats filled by the chief judges of the 
three lower courts (i.e. the Chancellor, the Judge of the Admiralty Court, and the 
Chief Judge of the General Court) —the chief judge of the originating court would 
recuse himself.  Id. at 61.   Although this may have mitigated the personnel problems 
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Even then, the court did not hear cases until after the Revolution because the 
judges were busy with the war effort.53  The Court of Appeals received its 
first transcripts in October, 1780 and heard its first case in May, 1783.54  
Staffing problems proved endemic.  Although one judge left the bench in 
1783 and another died in 1792, Maryland did not replace them until the 
Jeffersonians took power in 1801.55  Apparently nobody wanted the job.56  
     The lower courts, meanwhile, were slowly decentralizing to improve 
efficiency.  In 1785, Maryland enlarged the jurisdiction of the county courts.  
To get into the General Court, a case needed to be worth at least “one 
hundred pounds of current money.”57  Nevertheless, the system remained 
“attended with great inconvenience, delay and expense, to suits, witnesses 
and jurymen” and a lack of “uniformity of legal decisions.”58  In 1790, 
Maryland (imitating the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789) implemented a new 
system of five judicial districts to cover the state.59  Each district consisted of 
one chief justice, with legal training, and two associate justices, without legal 
training, in each county.60  These new judges, unlike the justices of the peace 
whom they replaced, held life-tenure.61   
     This system developed its own problems.  Declaring that “uniformity of 
legal decisions ought to be obtained as far as the circumstances will permit,” 
Maryland passed another judicial reform in 1796.62  The law expanded the 
powers of the new justices.  They could now handle bail, acknowledge 
deeds, and compel discovery of documents in actions at law using chancery 
court procedures.63  Maryland also banned various practices.  Justices on the 
new district courts could no longer “act as an attorney or solicitor in any 
court of law or equity” while in office.64  Plaintiffs in suits to collect debts 
could no longer arrest defendants outside of the county in which the suit took 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																						
on the Court, the Senate rejected the plan because it would entangle the appellate 
judiciary and the trial courts.  Id.  
53 BOND, supra note 36, at 72-74. 
54 Id. at 69-70, 74. 
55 Id. at 78. 
56 Id. 
57 1785 Md. Laws 142.  
58 1790 Md. Laws 496. 
59 1790 Md. Laws 497 (each district contained multiple counties).  
60 Id.   
61 Id. 
62 1795 Md. Laws 221.  
63 Id. at 222.  At common law, actions had no discovery.  In Equity, however, actions 
did.  This bill allowed (among other things) county judges to issue bills of discovery 
to compel the disclosure of books or writings in the possession of the litigant.   
64 Id.   
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place.65  Lawsuits could not continue beyond “the end of the first court after 
the imparlance court” without mutual consent or the discretion of the court.66  
     The reforms did not prove a panacea.  One observer in 1802 felt that 
creation of judicial districts had allowed “all the mischiefs and 
inconveniences that could possibly result from a combination of ignorance, 
prejudice, and partiality.”67  The associate justices “labour[ed] under an 
invincible ignorance” and sat “mute as alabaster busts” while the chief 
justice dictated the law “as the Pope among the Cardinals … infallible.”68  
 
IV.     1800-1805: THE JEFFERSONIAN REVOLUTION 
 
     Maryland’s judiciary reforms grew extremely political once power 
changed hands.  When the Jeffersonians won control of the Maryland House 
of Delegates in 1800, they reformed the judiciary.  Again, they made no 
mention of judicial elections.  The initial judicial reforms were not real 
reforms at all.  The Jeffersonians implemented them to steal patronage 
positions from defeated Federalists despite the life-tenure provisions.  They 
used a series of “ripper acts” to fire the Federalist judges despite life-tenure 
and succeeded in completely replacing the entire judiciary within half a 
decade.69 
                                                                                                                               
65 Id.   
66 Id. at 223. The “imparlance” court is the court that takes the pleadings in a case. 
The wording of 1795 Md. Laws 221 Section 11 is simply confusing.  “Unless by the 
consent of parties, at the discretion of the court,” or good legal cause.   
67 JOHN LEEDS BOZMAN, A NEW ARRANGEMENT OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE OF THE 
STATE OF MARYLAND PROPOSED 28 (1802).  Many sources, including a biography 
of Bozman from 1888 and library catalogs, ascribe this work to John Leeds Bozman.  
See SAMUEL HARRISON, A MEMOIR OF JOHN LEEDS BOZMAN: THE FIRST HISTORIAN 
OF MARYLAND 38 (1888).  Harrison claimed he had “excellent authority,” but after 
the custom of the nineteenth century, declined to provide it.  Id.  Ellis also attributes 
the pamphlet to Bozman, although without noting that it does not bear the author’s 
name.  ELLIS, supra note 41, at 333, n. 32.  Ellis, incidentally, relies on the pamphlet 
to show that the reforms in 1806 intended to “keep the courts under the control of the 
legal profession.”  Id. This writer can find no evidence that anyone took this 
pamphlet seriously at all.  Its proposed reforms did not become law.  To claim it 
shows early evidence of a lawyerly plot to retain control of the judiciary seems a 
rather large stretch.  At most, it shows that Bozman (and by extension others) wanted 
more lawyers on the bench. 
68 BOZMAN, supra note 67, at 33-34. 
69 A “ripper bill” or “ripper act” means, in modern parlance, “a statute that gives a 
government’s chief executive broad powers to appoint and remove department heads 
or other subordinate officials.”  Ripper Act, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (9th ed. 
2009).  That is close to the sense used here, although the bill left the governor no 
discretion on unseating judges.  Shugerman uses the term to refer to a law that strips 
appointed judges of their life-tenure offices, and this author follows his usage here.  
SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 37.  
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     By way of background, the defeated Federalists had not been bi-partisan 
in their judicial appointments.  They had filled the court positions created in 
1790 with party loyalists, breeding resentment among the minority 
Jeffersonians.  In fact, those appointees apparently abused their power to 
appoint election judges.70  That said, the Federalists (perhaps accidentally) 
left the Jeffersonians two open seats on the Court of Appeals.71   
     Things came to a head in 1800 when the Jeffersonians finally defeated the 
Federalists and took control of the Maryland legislature by a margin of 40-
37, with three independents.72  Over the next five years, the Jeffersonians 
widened their lead as Federalist efforts dwindled to “little more than a rear 
guard action to stop their enemy’s growth.”73  In 1801, for example, the 
Jeffersonians won by an even larger majority. They took forty-five seats to 
the Federalist’s twenty-eight, with five delegates in the center.74   
     The Jeffersonians promptly implemented a judicial ripper act.75  The law 
abolished the existing courts by repealing the 1796 statute that created 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																						
Ripper bills constitutionally functioned by abolishing the old court and creating an 
identical new one. 
70 NORMAN RISJORD, CHESAPEAKE POLITICS, 1781-1800, at 477 (1978).  At any rate, 
the Jeffersonians saw the need to remove that function immediately. 
71 BOND, supra note 36, at 78.  Bond, studiously ignoring the politics involved, 
ascribed the failure to fill the seat to a lack of qualified candidates.  Shugerman, 
however, feels the Federalists “botched their appointments to the Court of Appeals.”  
SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 44.  This seems unlikely.  The 1800 election produced 
a divided government that elected a Federalist governor.  MARX RENZULLI, 
MARYLAND: THE FEDERALIST YEARS 217 (1973).  Even if the Federalists had 
somehow forgotten to fill the positions while anticipating defeat in the 1800 election, 
they had an additional year before they lost the governorship. The Jeffersonians 
cemented their position on the Court of Appeals by mandating that vacancies would 
remain unfilled until the Court shrunk to three judges.  1801 Md. Laws  73.  
Shugerman believes that this kicked two judges off the bench.  SHUGERMAN, supra 
note 5, at 44.  He follows Risjord’s interpretation of the statute, although Risjord 
believes there were only four justices on the bench at the time, so only one lost their 
seat.  RISJORD, supra note 70, at 477.  That reading of the 1801 Bill contradicts the 
explicit text of the Statute.  It also contradicts Maryland’s official list.  Historical 
List: Maryland Court of Appeals Judges, 1778-, ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, 
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/speccol/sc2600/sc2685/html/ctappj.html (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2012). 
72 RENZULLI, supra note 71, at 215.  Although the independents mostly voted 
Republican, they voted Federalist often enough to elect a Federalist governor and 
U.S. Senator.  Id.   
73 Id. at 227-28. 
74 RISJORD, supra note 70, at 565.   
75 RENZULLI, supra note 71 at 215, 227; SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 37. 
For a blow by blow account of the procedural maneuvers to pass the bill, including a 
Suspension of the Rules and an analysis of voting patterns showing hyper-
partisanship, see RISJORD, supra note 70, at 477-78. 
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them.76  The same ripper act also created “new” courts by incorporating the 
text of that same 1796 statute.77  The law made some changes.  The levy 
courts, composed of Justices of the Peace appointed to one-year terms, would 
name the election judges, not the life-tenure county judges.78  Practically, 
however, this law fired every judge in the district courts notwithstanding 
their life-tenure.  The Jeffersonians then filled the seats with their own 
appointments. 
     The Federalist incumbents sued.79  The General Court, equally vulnerable 
to a ripper bill, declined to intervene.80  Instead, it pulled a reverse Marbury 
v. Madison; the court held that it could have stricken the bill down, had it 
been unconstitutional.81  This holding did nothing for the ousted judges. 
     The Jeffersonians did not stop there.  They promptly passed another 
reform bill aimed at the General Court and the Court of Appeals in 1802.82  
(As a Constitutional Amendment, the bill needed to pass twice in consecutive 
sessions before taking effect.83)  This bill abolished the General Court and 
created a two-tiered judiciary.  Two lawyer District Justices in each of five 
districts would sit in each county court within their district alongside a non-
                                                                                                                               
76 1801 Md. Laws 66.  
77 The 1801 Law is substantially identical to the old law.  For example, the 1790 
Law established that the governor and council would appoint the justices of the 
County Courts.  1790 Md. Laws 497. The 1796 Law repealed all of the 1790 Law 
except Section 4, which it adopted directly.  1796 Md. Laws 221.  The 1801 Law 
contains the same language as the 1796 law until it reaches the incorporation.  Even 
though it later explicitly repeals the 1790 Law, 1801 Md. Laws 76, it replaces the 
incorporation of the 1790 Law with the exact language of the 1790 Act. Although 
the laws were not identical, most differences are hard to spot.  Those differences 
relate to particular details of application not relevant to the present discussion.  For 
example, Section Four of the 1801 Act is Section Five of the 1796 Act, except for a 
small three line clause at the end preventing the clause from effecting the powers of 
“the court of oyer and terminer and gaol delivery for Baltimore County or giving the 
county court of Baltimore criminal jurisdiction.”  1801 Md. Laws 67.  While this 
may have made all the differences to some people back then, they are largely 
irrelevant to the question at hand. 
78 1801 Md. Laws 70. 
79 Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236 (Md. 1802).  Whittington enjoyed the spotlight 
in its day because it did not happen in a vacuum.  The decision largely foreshadowed 
Marbury v. Madison by a few months.  The author of the opinion, Jeremiah Townley 
Chase, was the cousin and close friend of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase, and 
political observers closely watched Whittington to see the reaction of a Federalist 
Judiciary.  SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 38. 
80 See Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236. 
81 Id.  Like the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, the Whittington Court spent 
several pages extolling judicial review in dicta before not stopping the law.  Id. at 
242-245. 
82 1802 Md. Laws 63.  
83 MD CONST. OF 1776, art. LIX. 
2016] Judicial Elections  
 
99 
lawyer Associate Justice from the county.84  The bill also fired the sitting 
Court of Appeals judges just as the previous bill had fired the old district 
judges.85   
     Then politics reshuffled.  The confirmation bill failed in 1803 because 
moderate Republicans and Federalists united against it.86  The next year, the 
new centrist coalition passed its own reform bill.87  This new law 
implemented massive court reform.  It divided the state into six judicial 
districts.88  Three lawyerly district judges would sit on each county court in a 
district.89  The abolished General Court was folded into a new Court of 
Appeals, composed of the Chief Judges of the new Districts.90  Like the 
previous legislation, however, this act also fired every judge in the state.  
Unlike the fate of its predecessor, the bill’s backers held together and enacted 
it.  The confirmation bill passed the following year.91   
     Although the bill “ripped” the Court of Appeals and General Court, it did 
not produce a complete personnel change, or even a partisan one.92  The new 
coalition rehired two out of the three judges of the General Court as Chief 
Judges and retained many of the judges of the district courts.93  Many of the 
                                                                                                                               
84 1802 Md. Laws 64. 
85 Id. 
86 Ellis claims that moderate Republicans and Federalists allied against the Bill 
because it “endanger the independence of the judiciary and would allow the courts to 
come under the control of people untrained in the law.”  ELLIS, supra note 41, at 244.  
This seems unlikely.  First, the bill would have given lawyers a majority on the 
bench to outvote non-lawyers for the first time, so it could hardly put laymen in 
charge of the courts.  If anything, it did the opposite.  Second, it seems rather late in 
the day for lawmakers to develop scruples about judicial independence. Rather, it 
seems more likely based on the final version of the bill eventually passed by this 
coalition, 1804 Md. Laws 45, that it did not do enough to professionalize the courts.  
Based on their appointments, it seems that the new coalition adopted bipartisanship.  
87 ELLIS, supra note 41, at 244.   
88 1804 Md. Laws 45. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 8.  Strangely, Shugerman believes that Whittington v. Polk gave the General 
Court sufficient political cover to withstand the movement to abolish it.  
SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 33.  He is simply mistaken.  
92 BOND, supra note 36, at 97-98. 
93 BOND, supra note 36, at 99-104.  Bond lists two judges of the General Court and 
two of the District Courts whom the Governor offered Chief Judgeships.  Judge 
Jeremiah Chase, both a Federalist and Samuel Chase’s cousin and friend, wound up 
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals.  Id.; SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 38.  The 
third General Court Judge, John Done, wound up as an Associate Judge in the Fourth 
District and was eventually promoted to Chief Judge in 1814.  John Done (ca. 1747-
1831), ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/speccol/sc3500/ 
sc3520/000300/000353/html/msa00353.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2012). 
Interestingly, Judge James Tilghman, whom John Leeds Bozman positively hated, 
kept his seat as Chief Judge of the Second District.  BOND, supra note 36, at 99-104.  
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new judges, including the new Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals, were 
Federalists.94  But the new leadership declined to rehire any of the Justices of 
the Court of Appeals as Chief Judges of the district courts.95  The leadership 
offered two incumbent judges —both seventy-one years old— seats as 
associate judges, and only one accepted.96  The others lost their jobs, life-
tenure notwithstanding. 
 
V.     1806-1850: LEAD UP TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 
 
     Reform in Maryland moved slowly, although similar concerns appeared 
elsewhere.  Beginning in 1833, for example, states began switching to 
judicial elections to disempower their respective legislatures.97  The calls for 
reform first gathered strength because Democrats —victims of a historic 
gerrymander— did not let a crisis go to waste.  While the major focus of the 
crisis was economic and political, judicial reform was also present. 98  It 
merely did not take the front seat.  
     Maryland’s road toward judicial elections began in early 1836.  
Supporters of internal improvements promised “certain and immediate” 
returns to persuade Maryland to fund their projects with “millions upon 
millions of public debts.”99 Not surprisingly, this proved too good to be true 
and Maryland quickly went bankrupt.100  Marylanders promptly sought major 
political reform.101 
     This call for reform exposed already existing complaints about 
apportionment of the Legislature.  In an effort to balance sectional interests, 
Maryland had watered down Baltimore’s votes. This caused gross mal-
																																								 																																							 																																							 																						
Bozman caricatured Tilghman in his pamphlet arguing for reform, spending three 
pages on a prolonged (although anonymous) character assassination against a Chief 
Judge of a District in Maryland.  BOZMAN, supra note 67, at 31-33.  Harrison 
insists that what Bozman presents as caricature is in fact portrait.  HARRISON, supra 
note 67, at 39-40.  The Governor of Maryland and his council apparently disagreed 
with Bozman’s assessment.  
94 BOND, supra note 36, at 99-104.   
95 Id. at 97; Historical List: Maryland Court of Appeals Judges, 1778-, ARCHIVES OF 
MARYLAND, http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/speccol/sc2600/sc2685/html/ctappj.html 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2016). 
96 BOND, supra note 36, at 97-98; see also Historical List: Maryland Court of 
Appeals Judges, supra note 95. 
97 See SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 10. 
98 See JAMES WARNER HARRY, THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTION OF 1851 18-19, 47 
(1902). 
99 Id. 
100 See id.; SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 85 (Maryland was not alone; nine States 
folded as a result of the ensuing Panics. The recession lasted until 1843.).  
101 See HARRY, supra note 98, at 17. 
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apportionment.102  Maryland watered down Baltimore’s votes.  Baltimore, a 
city of 80,000, both had two senators and two delegates as Annapolis, 
“normally a quiet town of several thousand.”  103  Maryland’s sparsely 
populated counties, by way of comparison, received four delegates each 
regardless of population.104   
     In the 1836 elections, the Whigs won a 21-19 majority in the Maryland 
Senate’s Electoral College despite losing the election by about three 
thousand popular votes.105  A political crisis erupted when the Democrats 
refused to attend the convention to elect the Senate, denying it a quorum.106  
Without a Senate, Maryland’s government could not function.  Although the 
Democrats eventually caved, the Whig-dominated General Assembly decided 
to pass a Reform Bill.107  Although activists wanted a wide variety of judicial 
reforms, including the abolition of gubernatorial appointments and life-
tenure, the resulting Reform Bill in 1837 did not change the judiciary.108   
     Demands for judicial reform resurfaced in 1844. As a result, the General 
Assembly created an investigatory committee focused on judicial reform..109  
People wanted broad reform because of “the necessity of all practical 
economy in the expenditures of government” and “the embarrassed condition 
of the finances of our State.”110  In simpler terms, Maryland was broke.  The 
Committee, however, feared that reforming the judiciary “solely with a view 
to its cheapness” would be “false and suicidal economy.”111  The Committee 
instead recommended other reforms, including firing the life-tenured 
Chancellor and one life-tenured associate judge in each district.112  But the 
reforms to come in 1850 were already under discussion.  The Committee 
already felt it needed to advocate retaining life-tenure.113  The Committee 
reported reform bills towards the end of the session in early March, but they 
failed to pass.114 
                                                                                                                               
102 See ROBERT BRUGGER, MARYLAND: A MIDDLE TEMPERAMENT 228 (1988). 
103 For the relative sizes of Baltimore and Annapolis, see id. at 228. 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 229.  Maryland chose its Senate via an electoral college, similar to the 
method by which America elects the President of the United States. 
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 HARRY, supra note 98, at 18-19, 47.  1836 Md. Laws 190. 
109 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON GRIEVANCES AND COURTS OF JUSTICE TO WHOM 
WERE REFERRED THREE ORDERS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES RELATIVE TO THE 
JUDICIARY 2 (1844).  Proposals included switching to six judicial circuits, each 
paying $2000, shrinking the Court of Appeals to three seats, and a special court 
system for Baltimore. 
110 Id. at 3.  
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 8. 
113 Id. at 9. 
114 Id. at 1.  The Committee delivered its reports on March 5th.  No mention appears 
in the Session Laws of the year. 
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     Political agitation for reform continued.  After a Stamp Tax popularly 
known as the “British Stamp Act” went into effect in 1845, Maryland public 
opinion wanted  a convention to rein in the Legislature.115  After an 1845 bill 
calling for a convention failed by a tie vote, the legislature took up the issue 
again in the next session in 1847.116  It did not call for a political convention 
because doing so while the state was “involved in financial embarrassment of 
the most serious character” would hurt Maryland’s credit. 117  But the calls 
continued.  The Democratic candidate, running on a reform platform, carried 
the next gubernatorial election by all of 709 votes.118  The overwhelming 
agitation in 1850 led the Governor to warn the General Assembly that if it 
did not call a convention, “the sanction of the [L]egislature would not much 
longer be invoked.”119  So the General Assembly called a referendum on a 
Convention, which the pro-Convention faction won. 
 
VI.     THE CONVENTION OF 1850 
 
     Scholars give various reasons for the 1850 convention.  Bond ascribes the 
convention to reapportionment.120  Brugger ascribes it to the same 
Baltimorean discontent regarding apportionment and high taxes used to pay 
off the State debt.121  Evitts ascribes it to the same, as well as to the 
“universal appeal” of judicial reform.122  Harry lists four causes: the mal-
apportionment of the Legislature, anger at legislative constitutional 
amendments, dislike of life-tenure in the judiciary, and the “lack of 
constitutional check upon the legislature in the expenditures of the public 
money.”123 
     The Convention dedicated an enormous amount of time to debating 
judicial reforms. The debates spanned approximately 350 pages of the 
Convention’s written record.124  But surprisingly, judicial election was only a 
                                                                                                                               
115 HARRY, supra note 98, at 22. 
116 Id. at 22-23. 
117 Id. at 23-24. 
118 Id. at 24. 
119 HARRY, supra note 98, at 29. 
120 BOND, supra note 36, at 146. 
121 BRUGGER, supra note 103, at 258.  The State spent a fortune paying for its debts, 
and had indeed suspended payment on bonds between 1841 and 1848.  Id. at 232. 
122 WILLIAM EVITTS, A MATTER OF ALLEGIANCES: MARYLAND FROM 1850 TO 1861, 
at 34 (1974). 
123 HARRY, supra note 98, at 25. 
124 The debates on the judiciary committee of the convention begin midway through 
the second volume.  2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND REFORM 
CONVENTION TO REVISE THE STATE CONSTITUTION 460 (1851) [hereinafter 
DEBATES].  They end on page 803 of the same volume.  Id. at 803.  Although the 
Convention discussed other matters during the intervening 343 pages, they spent the 
vast majority of their time fighting about the judiciary.  
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small part of a larger battle over the judiciary.  It was not even the most 
important part.  Bowie, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, deemed it a 
dismal failure to consider bringing about “a mere change in the mode of 
appointment” as the only reform.125  Chambers, Bowie’s main opponent, 
thought that the main issue was life-tenure.126 
     Supporters of judicial elections controlled the Convention’s committee on 
the subject.127  They endorsed a wide range of reforms.  Their agenda 
prominently featured term limits and judicial elections.128  Their reforms 
would also “rip” the existing judges out of their seats.129 
     The dissenters shared a different vision.  They did not rip the existing 
judiciary.130  In fact, Chambers, one of the leading opponents of judicial 
reform at the Convention, served as Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals.131  
The dissenters’ report retained both life-tenure and gubernatorial 
appointments.132  But that report did not speak for all opinions.  One 
delegate, for example, wanted to pick judges by “joint ballot of the two 
Houses of the General Assembly.”133  
     Supporters of almost every conceivable position claimed popular support.  
According to Bowie, judicial elections alone had led Southern Maryland and 
the Eastern Shore to support the Convention despite the risk of 
reapportionment.134  But Bowie later admitted that he “never attended a 
political meeting in [his] own county,” and had in fact been nominated in 
absentia.  He had no first-hand knowledge of what the people wanted.135  
                                                                                                                               
125 Id.  For Mr. Bowie’s role as chairman of the judiciary committee, see 1 DEBATES, 
supra note 126, at 239. 
126 When Judge Chambers published his speech, he titled it the “Speech on the 
Judicial Tenure,” indicating what he thought the major issue was.  EZEKIEL 
CHAMBERS, SPEECH ON THE JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE MARYLAND CONVENTION, 
APRIL 1851 (1851).   
127 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 460.  There were only three or four dissenters.  
128 1 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 239-43. 
129 Id. at 239-43. 
130 Id. at 516-19.  To be clear, they explicitly continued the previous judiciary in 
office.  They did not merely want to re-hire all sitting justices. 
131 For Judge Chambers’ biography, see Ezekiel Forman Chambers, ARCHIVES OF 
MARYLAND, http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc5400/sc5496/034600/ 
034613/html/034613bio.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).  Chambers, termed 
“Chambers of Kent” to distinguish him from the other Mr. Chambers, spoke 
repeatedly on the Judiciary.  
132 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 516-17.  
133 Id. at 460.  
134 Id. at 460-61.  Maryland’s constitution had an incredible apportionment 
gerrymander that guaranteed Southern Maryland and the Eastern Shore 
disproportionate population relative to Baltimore.   
135 Id. at 501.  Although nobody actually sent the convention a petition about the 
topic, Mr. Bowie claimed that only one petition had been received, which was “in 
reference to the sale of ardent spirits.”  Id. at 461.  Mr. Bowie –as pointed out there 
	
104 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 46.2	
	
Tuck, a delegate from the same county, had not canvassed the county either, 
but firmly believed that the people favored life-tenure.136  Chambers, 
advocating for gubernatorial appointment and life-tenure, claimed his district 
supported his position.137  Spencer, advocating for gubernatorial appointment 
and term limits, claimed that his public support was “immutable and as fixed 
as the mountains” and had been so “for the last twenty years.”138  Merrick 
claimed that everyone in Carroll County supported judicial elections, but 
Phelps, his colleague from the same district, claimed he had won after 
running against judicial elections.139  Others simply admitted that their voters 
were largely ignorant.  Hicks’s constituents in Dorchester County primarily 
wanted their taxes cut.140  One had “thought [Dorchester County was] 
exclusively ill-treated because the Convention was not there.”141  This 
constituent had “cursed the man; he had never seen him, and if Mr. 
Convention would not show himself among the people, he would not vote for 
him.”142   
     Supporters of judicial elections rested their beliefs on Jacksonian political 
theory.  They believed that since “all power emanates from the people,” the 
people are sovereign.143  Appointing judges is a “necessary incident to 
sovereignty itself.”144  To these supporters, this was no innovation; their 
principles were those of 1776.145  The people had simply delegated the power 
to appoint judges to their elected representatives, the politicians.146 
     Reformers believed that those politicians had turned judicial appointments 
into “a mere political machine in the hands of the Governor and his 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																						
and as reading the debates easily shows— was simply mistaken.  The Convention 
received numerous sundry petitions.  This author has no idea what Mr. Bowie meant. 
136 Id. at 520. 
137 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 467. 
138 Id. at 491. 
139 Id. at 501. 
Mr. Merrick had served in the United States Senate from 1837 to 1845.  Historical 
List of United States Senators, ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, http://msa.maryland.gov/ 
msa/speccol/sc2600/sc2685/html/fedsenmems.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2013.) 
140 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 502.  
Mr. Hicks went on to become governor of Maryland from 1858 to 1862.  He kept 
Maryland in the Union.  See Thomas Holiday Hicks (1798-1865), ARCHIVES OF 
MARYLAND, http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc3500/sc3520/001400/ 
001462/html/1462extbio.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
141 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 502. 
142 Id. at 502.  Mr. Hicks apparently did not disabuse the man of this notion, for he 
relates the person indeed refused to vote for Mr. Convention.  And indeed, Mr. 
Convention lost in Dorchester, 251-399.  HARRY, supra note 98, at 85. 
143 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 462. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 563. 
146 Id. at 463. 
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friends. . . by which the interests of … the State have been sacrificed.”147  
Past governors had neither looked for “legal attainments and uprightness” 
nor for “integrity of character … honesty” and “capability.”148  Rather, they 
had selected “mere partisan adherents to certain political creeds … old and 
infirm men, not fit, either mentally or physically” for the bench.149  In fact, 
Bowie could not recall a single instance since 1776 where the politicians 
“have not made the appointment depend more or less on the political 
complexion of the applicant.”150  Spencer even charged that some judges had 
“been nominated by political conventions.”151  
     Indeed, Bowie felt that the people could “do quite as well as [the 
Legislature]” at appointing judges.152  If the people might make bad choices 
or follow partisan considerations, politicians “have done the same thing, 
have always done so, and will. . . always do so.”153  That said, Bowie did not 
think the people would actually select bad judges.  He thought that they 
would “generally vote for the most trustworthy” candidate.154  Or at least 
they might.155  The Governor and Senate, meanwhile, “never have and never 
will, from now until the day of judgment.”156  Not all supporters thought it 
would end happily though.  Merrick felt that if the people elected bad judges, 
“they will and they should suffer by it.”157 
     Supporters of judicial elections directly addressed concerns about judicial 
independence.158  Bowie agreed that judges should be independent of 
                                                                                                                               
147 Id.  Fascinatingly, Chambers denied that any appointments to the bench had been 
partisan.  Id. at 467-68.  The debates are unclear if anyone believed him, but nobody 
acted like he denied the obvious.  
148 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 463.  
149 Id. 
150 Id.  In Pennsylvania, Samuel Smucker made the charge more bluntly.  He claimed 
that in Pennsylvania, judgeships went to “the relations —the brothers, the cousins, 
the sons-in-law” of the sitting governor.  SAMUEL SMUCKER, ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR 
OF A POPULAR JUDICIARY 4 (1850).  If no relatives could take the seat, the 
appointments then devolved to the Governor’s political cronies.  Id.   
151 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 490.  Maryland did not complain alone.  One 
delegate in Pennsylvania’s comparable convention alleged that appointments as 
Justices of the Peace had become “a sort of small coin, to pay small partisans in the 
war of elections.” JOSEPH HOPKINSON, SPEECHES OF JOSEPH HOPKINSON AND 
CHARLES CHAUNCEY ON THE JUDICIAL TENURE DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF 
PENNSYLVANIA FOR REVISING THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1838).  Apparently, 
Pennsylvanian governors had begun to issue “hundreds of them” in the last weeks of 
their lame duck terms.  Id. 
152 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 463. 
153 Id. at 464. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id.  
157 Id. at 501. 
158 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 464. 
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“improper bias —independent of all impressions. . . made upon their minds 
by wicked, artful and treacherous practices.”159  But he believed that judges 
should never become “independent of the people.”160  In fact, public opinion 
possessed a “wholesome restraint and moral sense” worthy of obedience.161  
That said, Bowie considered some judicial independence necessary and 
thought that long terms would obtain that.162  
     Additionally, these supporters also favored term limits.  Bowie, for 
example, hated life-tenure.  In fact, he thought that “any term of years” 
would be better “than the present life-tenure.”163  He suggested that life-
tenure “leads to great abuses” because judges “become independent of public 
opinion, independent of the people, independent of every wholesome 
restraint.”164  This concentrates power “in the hands of a certain class of 
lawyers” who practice before the Court of Appeals of Maryland, giving them 
“utterly” uncontrollable influence over the court.165  Regular turnover would 
keep judges responsive and honest. 
     Other speakers gave different reasons for supporting term limits.  Spencer 
thought that “a limited tenure is the main and chief security of an efficient 
and wise judiciary.”166  Life-tenure made judges omnipotent because it let 
them “forget their individuality and look at themselves as something more 
than judges.”167  Elections would let the people keep judges humble.168  
Spencer did not believe that regular elections would tempt judges to “pander 
to the public appetite” though.  If a judge did so, he would “sink himself to 
all infamy and oblivion” and never win another election.169 
     In fact, some writers on the subject suggested that removing life-tenure 
would speed up the court system.170  It would “simplify. . . legal process, and 
thereby promote the ends of justice.”171  According to Samuel Smucker, all 
delay stemmed from “perfectly irresponsible” judges. Smucker believed that 
the judges were irresponsible because of their life-tenure.172  In fact, Smucker 
believed that all life-tenure was merely part of an “immense mass of 
corruption,” that had built up over time and which needed to go.173   
                                                                                                                               
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 464-65. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 465-66. 
163 Id. at 466. 
164 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 466. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 488. 
167 Id. at 488 and 490. 
168 Id. at 490. 
169 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 488. 
170 SMUCKER, supra note 152, at 8. 
171 Id.  
172 Id.  
173 Id. 
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     Smucker also thought that requiring judges to campaign would in turn 
force them to develop a record to run on.174 He recognized that electioneering 
would be embarrassing for judges, but did not care. For example, he thought  
an election bill that ran “Vote for Judge Snapdragon!  He overruled Binks vs. 
Jenks, quashed the writ in Gerrymander’s case, and delivered the great 
dissenting opinion in in re Dishwater” would be a probable and favorable 
result of allowing judicial elections175  Judges would probably hate having to 
campaign, but the judges would want to win reelection. This would require 
them to develop a good track record as judge to campaign on.176 
     Supporters of judicial elections did not fear mob rule.177  In event of 
revolution, truly independent judges would not stop the unrest.  Even the best 
judges would be mere “ropes of sand,” unable to restrain an angry mob.178  
Those worried about mob rule thought that appointed judges would be just as 
bad.  Mr. Gwinn recalled judicial abuses perpetrated by appointed judges 
obeying tyrants, like Judge Jeffreys’ “terrible campaign” and “the trial of 
Queen Caroline.”179 
     For many supporters, political parties provided part of the solution.  
Although Mr. Hicks distrusted “the influence of party spirit over the people,” 
he thought that open partisanship would reduce corruption.180  If the parties 
nominated the judges, at least someone took responsibility for the 
appointment.181  Under the status-quo system before 1850, “those who 
recommend [judges] … are enveloped in a dark cloud, are in obscurity, and 
are never known.”182  Others thought that the fickle nature of party politics 
                                                                                                                               
174 Id. at 9. 
175 SMUCKER, supra note 152, at 9. 
176 Id. 
177 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 490. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. George Jeffreys, 1st Baron Jeffreys of Wem PC (1645-1689), was best known 
as the original “hanging judge”  for his propensity for mercilessly administering a 
cruel brand of justice. William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment Presumptions a 
Constitutional Framework for Curbing Mass Incarceration, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 67, 
n. 139 (2015). During the Blood Assizes trials, Jeffreys led the commission 
responsible for convicting, sentencing and executing between 150 to 200 prisoners in 
less than one month. Arthur W. Machen, Jr., The Bloody Judge Sir George Jeffreys 
(1645 – 1689), 11-SUM Experience 38, 39-40 (2001). Justice Antonin Scalia even 
referred to him as “dread Lord Jeffreys.”  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 
(2004). Queen Caroline’s Case, 129 Eng. Rep. 976, 2 B & B 284 (1820) was the O.J. 
Simpson case of its time.  King George IV (a philanderer if there ever was one) 
attempted to divorce his unwanted wife, Queen Caroline, by accusing her of 
adultery.  The proceedings in the trial were so infamous they produced the “Rule in 
Queen Caroline’s Case,” only repealed by FED. R. EVID. 613(a).   
Mr. Gwinn was a prominent lawyer.  HARRY, supra note 98, at 35-36. 
180 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 530. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
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would keep judges in line.183  Hyper-partisan judges knew that their jobs 
were at risk whenever the political winds changed.184  This would keep them 
honest.185  A third set of delegates believed that no party would actually 
nominate a corrupt judge because “[t]hat would be to impugn the purity of 
the parties of this country, and to assume that their purpose is an abuse of 
power.”186  If partisan judges began ignoring  precedent to appease political 
whims, “it would be too offensive, too outrageous, to be tolerated in any 
community in the State.”187  In fact, it would be counter-productive.  People 
would not vote for men guilty of such shameless conduct.188 
     Even supporters of judicial elections disagreed over the issue of “re-
eligibility.”189  Some loved the idea.  Buchannan wanted to be able to 
congratulate “faithful servants,” but wanted unfaithful ones to “depart into 
outer darkness.”190  Tuck thought that if judges could not be re-elected, good 
candidates would never take the bench in the first place.191  Bowie thought 
that re-eligibility would allow judges to remain in their positions while 
preventing them from cultivating political allies in hopes of securing a  job 
after leaving the bench.192  Brent thought that re-eligibility would incentivize 
good behavior from judges who wanted re-election.193  Merrick thought that 
without re-eligibility, taking the bench “would be fiscal suicide for “any 
competent lawyer.194  But others disagreed.  Howard thought it would 
“increase the number of temptations” for bad judges looking for their next 
job.195  Chambers thought re-eligibility would encourage pandering to the 
majority.196  Supporters of re-eligibility acknowledged this concern but could 
live it. Merrick, for example, did not fear pandering.197  He thought that if 
Maryland were “so corrupt, so regardless of [its] own best interests, God 
help the Republic —God help all chance or hope of security.”198 
                                                                                                                               
183 Id. at 488-89. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 488-89. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Re-eligibility means the ability of a judge to run for re-election. 
190 Id. at 535. 
191 Id. at 520. 
192 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 523. 
193 Id.at 525. 
194 Id. at 534.  Brent pointed out that while a Baltimore Judge earned only $3000, all 
told, a good lawyer could earn “$8000, or even $8500 per year.”   Id.  Only a “nabob 
or a Croesus, or perhaps a man ready to go on it for any thing [sic] at all” would take 
the job.  Id. at 555.  While Maryland has experienced some inflation since then, this 
author is assured the basic realities remain the same. 
195 Id. at 530. 
196 Id. at 525. 
197 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 534. 
198 Id.  
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     Opponents of judicial elections had a radically different narrative centered 
on judicial independence and minority rights.  Chambers focused heavily on 
“the independence of the judiciary…and as necessary to that independence, 
the tenure as we know have it … during good behavior.”199  He wanted 
judicial independence to protect “the humble, the obscure, and the impotent 
… the minority,” not to rubberstamp majority rule.200  But the method of 
selection was a sideshow.  For opponents of judicial elections, the main issue 
was the “judicial tenure.”201 
     The two sides directly disagreed about Jacksonian political theory.  
Chambers thought that Jacksonianism led to an absurd result.  The “direct 
and legitimate result of such a theory” would “require a dissolution of all 
society into an absolute, unqualified, unmixed democracy” fit only for “a 
community composed of some few families of men.”202  The theory’s logical 
conclusion was that “the people are not to elect a Judge.  No, sir, they —that 
is, a majority of the people— must act as judge.”203  By allowing the people 
to “execute (in mass) the duties and officers created by the government”, the 
doctrine would “impeach every act and measure of the government not only 
of Maryland, but of every other State in this union; yes sir, of every civilized 
government that has ever existed!”204  The people would do what they 
wanted, “and neither Constitution nor law could resist or oppose their 
sovereign will!”205 
     Unlike Bowie, Chambers thought that judges ought to be independent of 
the people because the people themselves could turn tyrant as well as any 
king.206  Judges needed professional freedom to do their duty, freedom they 
did not have “when their very existence [as judges] depends upon doing 
otherwise.”207  Chambers even darkly reminded the convention that they had 
“heard of Lynch law.”208 
     Judicial elections, according to Chambers, would destroy judicial 
independence.  An independent judge possessed “a freedom from all motive 
                                                                                                                               
199 Id. at 466.  
Bond considered Chambers’ speech the best of the convention, and one still worthy 
of note.  BOND, supra note 36, at 149.  After the convention, someone had it printed 
in Baltimore.  CHAMBERS, supra note 128.   
200 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 469. 
201 When Judge Chambers published his speech, he titled it the “Speech on the 
Judicial Tenure,” indicating what he thought the major issue was.  CHAMBERS, supra 
note 128.   
202 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 469. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 469-70. 
206 Id. at 473-74. 
207 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 475. 
208 Id. at 477.  Ironically, Chambers spent much time and effort defending slavery.  
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to do wrong; an exemption from all fear to right.”209  Judicial elections gave 
judges an incentive to corrupt justice in favor of the powerful and popular.210  
Although some judges would be honest, not “every man was a Saint, or a 
Hero.”211  Chambers, in short, trusted potential candidates about as far as he 
could throw them. 
     Nor did opponents think that judicial elections would even fix the 
problems at hand.  Chambers did not believe that judicial elections would 
cure partisanship.212  Every candidate “will belong to one political family, or 
the other.”213  If the people insisted on someone without political affiliations, 
they would be “obliged to select from a class of persons, who are below the 
ordinary grade of intellect.”214  Others feared that good judges would not 
seek the bench, leaving the elections to party nominees.215  And “by what 
magic can the people select one good man out of two bad ones?”216 
     Some delegates at the convention supported retaining gubernatorial 
appointments because they thought that other reforms would solve the 
problems.  Spencer believed that all partisan appointments happened because 
governors controlled “the entire patronage of the State.”217  The Convention 
stripped the governors of these appointments, mainly by making judges 
elected.218  If judges were the only gubernatorial appointment, no governor 
would possess “the temerity … to select a judge because he belongs to one 
party or the other.”219 
     Not all arguments against judicial elections centered on policy.  Many 
opponents of judicial elections opposed radical reforms on principal.  
Chambers advocated caution because he thought a lot was at stake.  Judicial 
elections were “a step proposed, which can never be retraced.”220  At stake 
were “the rights of persons, the rights of property and of reputations. … All 
we hold dear.”221  This was about more than party politics.222  It was about 
“the poor, the injured, the oppressed, the helpless —the orphan, the desolate 
                                                                                                                               
209 Id. at 471. 
210 Id. at 472. 
211 Id. at 473. 
212 Id. at 477. 
213 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 478. 
214 Id. at 478. 
215 Id. at 516. 
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217 Id. at 491. 
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219 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 491. 
220 Id. at 479.  With historic hindsight, Chambers was entirely correct on this point.  
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widow.”223  If the Convention failed now, “the neglect can be repaired by no 
human power.”224  
     Opponents pointed to tradition to justify their anti-change stance.  
Chambers appealed to the Founding Fathers.225  He claimed that Jefferson 
was the only Founding Father to support judicial elections, and that John 
Adams, a most reliable source on Jefferson, had told Chambers that Jefferson 
only favored judicial elections “apparently with the feelings of a partisan, 
and under the influences which his best friends will most regret.”226  This 
alleged sentiment displayed the American roots of judicial independence and 
life-tenure.227 
     Unlike supporters of judicial elections, Chambers actively feared that 
elected judges would obey the fickle mob.  He invoked the French 
Revolution and Robespierre to exemplify the evils of judicial elections.228  
Indeed, he believed such a madness was already gripping the nation —
Abolition.229  That “phrenzied [sic] impulse has made havoc of every sense 
of duty [abolitionists] owe to their country and its laws.” Chambers warned 
that during frenzies like Abolition, elected judges would feel compelled to 
vote for abolition.230  This would be —for Chambers, at any rate— a horrible 
result.  After all, according to Chambers, angry mobs had coerced Pontius 
Pilate to sentence Jesus Christ to death in an apparently similar manner.231 
     Many individual delegates gave idiosyncratic reasons for their positions.  
Hicks wanted a permanent and independent judiciary for practical reasons — 
elections were disruptive, and nobody in his district cared that much 
anyway.232  Others feared that elections would create the appearance of 
                                                                                                                               
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 479. 
226 Id. at 480.  According to Chambers, Jefferson opposed life-tenure to get rid of 
Samuel Chase, but abandoned the plan to stick it to Mr. Randolph, the House 
Manager of the impeachment.  Id.  Mr. Spencer, speaking to rebut Chambers, 
directly challenged Chambers’ account of the facts, leading to sharp words on the 
Convention floor.  Id. at 489. 
227 Id. at 478-79. 
228 Id. at 481.  Chambers’ opponents on rebuttal called out and attacked the 
Robespierre reference.  Perhaps it was the equivalent of calling someone a 
“communist” today.  2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 489.  One even accused 
Chambers of dwelling “upon the bloody work of the guillotine, as if to excite us to 
some horror of the system we proposed.”  Id. at 497-98.  To supporters of Judicial 
Elections, the problem was not evil elections, but evil elected officials.  Id. at 498.  
229 Id. at 481. Chambers was deeply committed to slavery. He thought abolition was 
“a condition, not of idiotcy [sic] but of lunacy” from which the North would 
hopefully recover. It was the kind of mob rule he opposed. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 482.  Chambers’ delivered his remarks on Good Friday, so the allusion was 
topical if also extreme.  
232 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 503. 
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corruption.233  Judges would know who “abused [the judge’s] character to 
lowest point of infamy, and who have praised him as if he were a god.”234  If 
a judge ever ruled against the former or for the later, it would look like 
corruption.235  Still others thought it would endanger “the independence of 
the bar” by giving judges a way to reward their supporters and punish their 
opponents.236 
     The Convention had no shortage of other ideas.  Spencer, for example, 
wanted gubernatorial appointments like Chambers, but ten-year terms like 
Bowie.237  Phelps wanted to pick judges by joint ballot of the legislature, but 
that idea received a quick and overwhelming negative vote.238  Donaldson 
wanted the Legislature to recommend three men to the governor, who would 
then pick.239  Sollers spent the first part of the debate opposing every change, 
regardless of merit, on principle; he wanted to leave the judiciary entirly 
alone.240 
     The Convention resolved some issues much more quickly than others.  
Terms beat life-tenure early on by substantial margins.241  Mr. Crisfield, the 
sponsor of the life-tenure amendment, quickly conceded the point.242  A vote 
to strike judicial elections quickly came; judicial elections prevailed 
handily.243  The anti-re-eligibility amendment also failed comfortably.244   
     The final Constitution of 1850 “pleased nobody” in either the public or 
the convention.245  It could not get a majority in the Convention, so its 
sponsors used procedural gimmicks to insure it did not come up for a yes-no 
vote.246  One commentator suggested that the document cost about “$1.50 
per word, which, considering the quality of the goods, made it about the 
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236 Id. at 499. 
237 Id. at 486. 
238 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 487.  It lost 17-53. 
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242 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 501. 
Mr. Crisfield was a leading member of the Maryland Bar, and went on to become a 
member of the United States House of Representatives.  HARRY, supra note 98, at 
35; Historical List of United States Representatives, ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, 11, 
13, http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/speccol/sc2600/sc2685/html/fedrepmems.html (last 
visited on Jan. 17, 2013.)  
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hardest bargain of modern times.”247  Many people opposed it precisely 
because of the judicial reforms.248  But it passed, for better or worse, with a 
ten thousand vote majority.249 
 
VII.     CONCLUSION 
 
     The Maryland debates revealed a deeply divided body politic.  The main 
reason for switching to term-limited judicial elections was not the Jacksonian 
ideology cited by the supporters, although that certainly inspired them.  No 
evidence supports Hall’s lawyerly plot.  In fact, delegates often traded 
accusations about how some delegates loved lawyers “a little better than the 
people” and were multiplying judicial offices for them —accusations always 
vehemently denied.250  Maryland’s leading lawyers —men like Chambers— 
in fact opposed judicial elections.  No evidence, in short, indicates that 
lawyers conspired at all.  But it was not an attempt to disempower the 
legislature or cut expenses either.  The Convention clearly wanted to do both 
those things, but electing judges and limiting terms did neither.   
     Rather, judicial elections and term limits seem to be an assault on the 
spoils system.  Maryland had a long history of highly partisan judicial 
appointments.  The new Constitution marked the third “ripper act” in 
Maryland’s relatively short history.  By electing judges, Maryland hoped to 
reduce political corruption by removing the Governor’s patronage.  
Supporters of judicial elections and term limits thought their reforms would 
depoliticize the judiciary and allow the people to choose good judges.  
Opponents feared it would make judges kowtow to the popular will and do 
more harm than good.  Popular anger at the Legislature over bad fiscal 
policies and high taxes surely helped shape public opinion in what amounted 
to a no-confidence vote on the probity of politicians, but that did not cause 
judicial elections.  Political corruption did. 
     Maryland is still grappling with judicial elections two constitutions, a 
major constitutional rewrite, and a hundred and sixty-six years later.251 There 
are at least three bills presently pending in the House of Delegates to change 
the present system for judicial elections.  HB 388 (presently in its first 
reading) proposes to allow the governor to appoint judges subject to retention 
                                                                                                                               
247 Id. at 71 (quoting Editorial, BALT. AMERICAN, June 3, 1851). 
248 HARRY, supra note 98, at 70 (quoting Editorial, BALT. AMERICAN, June 2, 1851). 
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250 2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 536, 567, 597. 
251 Maryland scrapped the 1850 Constitution in 1864 as a result of the Civil War. It 
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GUIDE, 6-10 (2006).  
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amendments in the manner used for appellate judges —retention votes at the 
next election and every ten years thereafter.252 HB 224 appears to be a 
slightly older version of HB 388. The HB 388 version does a better job 
editing other related constitutional provisions to remove language 
inconsistent with its revisions and cuts the judicial term on the circuit court 
from 15 years to 10 years to make it consistent with the appellate courts.253 
This is not a new idea. It has been floating around Annapolis since at least 
2003.254 
     As a practical matter, retention elections “virtually guarantee[ ]” that 
judges will keep their seats.255 According to one study of states holding 
retention elections between 1964 and 2006, out of 6306 retention elections 
held, only 56 judges lost their seats.256 Maryland will likely follow the same 
pattern. In Maryland’s experience, retention elections for appellate judges 
have produced lopsided pro-retention votes. The average retention vote in 
Maryland, counting from the start of retention elections until 2006, was 
87.3%.257  
     HB 223 (also in its first reading at time of writing) has a different idea. It 
proposes that circuit court judges be appointed by the Governor and 
confirmed by the Senate to fifteen year terms in office, but that all circuit 
court judges confirmed by less than 80% of the Senate stand in a contested 
election (as they do now).258  This would add a step to the selection process 
since circuit court judges presently do not need to be confirmed by the 
Senate. This method would also allow the minority party to force elections. 
                                                                                                                               
252 H.D. 388, 2016 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2016).  
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Since the Maryland Senate has 47 seats, an 80% threshold means judges 
would require 38 votes to avoid the election. That practically means that only 
bi-partisan nominees would evade the ballot box.  
     These bills share a common theme.  They aim to reduce the odds of a 
judge losing his or her seat. HB 388 and HB 224 do this by switching to a 
system where incumbents have historically enjoyed an over 99% retention 
rate. HB 223 would allow a judge to retain his or her seat by holding 
elections only when the judge receives substantial opposition in the Senate. 
Neither bill proposes to outright abandon judicial elections though, despite 
all the academic criticism of it. Like the rest of America, Marylanders 
apparently like voting for judges.259  
                                                                                                                               
259 See supra note 6. The vast majority of judges in America are elected. 
